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S T A T E M E N T Q F J U R I S D I c T I Q N 
Thisnuiu: «)f v- irisdiction of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(h). This is an appeal in a domestic relations matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1, Did the trial court abuse * found that Appellee's 
yearly income, »rical earnings for previous years, not including 
ov< himi\ was $60,000.00? 
The award of child support will not be overturned willinii J duir ;ihir>. ii 
discretion. Reinhart v. Reinhart 9v < ••, 3/, /:>y (Uu-.
 s j \ , 1998). 
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2. Did the court abuse its discretion by determining that the amount paid 
by Ms. Waddle for care of the child outside of regular school hours was reasonable 
in light on no contrary evidence? 
The award of child support will not be overturned without a clear abuse of 
discretion. Reinhart v. Reinhart 963 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah App., 1998). 
3. Did the trial court act outside of its jurisdiction when it found that the 
father's share of his child's medical bills and day care expenses, which were paid by 
the mother, were nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code §523(a)? 
On a question of law this court gives the trial court no deference. Questions of law 
are reviewed for correctness. Hebertson v. Willowcreek, 923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 
1996). In this case, the trial court entered a finding that the medical expenses and the 
daycare expenses for his child which Appellant claims were discharged in bankruptcy 
were in the nature of family support. The award of child support will not be overturned 
without a clear abuse of discretion. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah App., 
1998). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it awarded Ms. Wardle 
attorneys' fees? 
Attorneys' fees may be awarded in the broad discretion of the court, and will not 
be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Court 
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of Appeals, 1991); Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980): Rasband v. 
Rasband.752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee, Rebecca Wardle ("Ms. Wardle"), and Appellant, Ricky Bowen ("Mr. 
Bowen"), are the biological parents of L.W., born December 13, 1994. This court entered 
a formal award of paternity on August 10, 1998. (R. 416). In that order, Mr. Bowen was 
ordered to pay one half of daycare expenses and medical expenses of the child as well as 
child support in the monthly amount of $214.00. (R. 411). The child support in the Order 
of Paternity was based on Mr. Bowen's monthly income of $1,846.00 and Ms. Wardle's 
monthly income of $1,387.00. (R. 411). Mr. Bowen failed to pay his share of daycare 
and some of the medical expenses of L.W. which Ms. Wardle paid for him. (R. 409-410) 
In September, 2000, Ms. Wardle filed a Petition to Modify Child Support which 
was later served in February, 2001. (R. 131-135; 411) Ms Wardle filed a Motion for 
Judgment to collect unpaid daycare and medical expenses for L.W. (R. 136-155; 409-
410). A trial was held on August 13, 2003 regarding the Petition to Modify Support and 
the certification of contempt as well as an objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation. (R. 419-422). 
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The court determined that Mr. Bowen had not followed its orders and ordered him 
to pay $6,000.00 to Ms. Wardle for attorneys fees she had incurred in her action for 
collection of child care reimbursement and a modification of support. (R. 414-415). The 
court awarded a judgment in favor of Ms. Wardle for past due child care and medical 
expenses. (R. 411). Ms. Wardle's placed L.W. at Challenger School in an all day Day 
Care program which cost $496.00 a month. (T. 71 In. 21 - 72 In. 20). A family member 
had watched L.W. previously. (R. 251; Trial Exhibit M:55) When L.W. began 
kindergarten, Ms. Wardle payed the entire cost of kindergarten tuition and only charged 
Mr. Bowen $111.00 a month for after school care. (T. 71 In. 21 - 72 In. 20; R. 410). 
There was no testimony of any less expensive option than Challenger School in 
evidence. (R. 410). The court found that day care expenses presented by Ms. Wardle 
were reasonable and awarded her a judgment against Mr. Bowen. (R. 410). 
At trial, Mr. Bowen failed to appear. (R. 419). However, his pay stubs and tax 
returns were stipulated to and admitted as exhibits. (Trial Exhibit M). The court 
determined that Mr. Bowen' income had increased to $5,000.00 a month for child support 
purposes and Ms. Wardle's income had increased to $2,894.00. (R. 411). Based upon 
these changes in income, the court determined that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances and modified child support using these incomes in accordance with the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines. (R. 411-413). 
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On the pay stubs in evidence before the court, Mr. Bowen's average income over 
the past four years was $64,333.00. (R. 412). The income on the pay stubs for 2002 
averaged $6,350.00 a month ($76,964.03 for the year). (Trial Exhibit M). The income or 
the paystubs for 2003 averaged $6,000 a month. (Trial Exhibit M). The court made an 
equitable adjustment in Mr. Bowen's favor because there had been some fluctuation in 
overtime over the past four years. (R. 412). The court lowered Mr. Bowen's income 
from $6,000 a month at the time of trial to $5,000 for purposes of calculating child 
support. (R. 412). 
The court found that Ms. Wardle was in need of assistance with her attorneys' fee 
based upon the outstanding amount of fees owed and her monthly income. (R.415) The 
court found that Mr. Bowen could afford to pay Ms. Wardle's attorneys fees based on his 
monthly income and his stated expenses. (R. 412; Trial Exhibit 2). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, the court has discretion to consider overtime in determining 
family support.when it is regular or consistent. In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Bowen's average yearly income was $6,000.00 a month or more in 2002 and 2003. (Trial 
Exhibit M). Based upon these average incomes, the court under Utah law could consider 
the overtime of Mr. Bowen to be regular and consistent. 
6 
Under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16, parents are equally responsible for day care 
expenses. There was no evidence to suggest that the amount of $496.00 a month for full 
day care was unreasonable. Therefore, the court properly ordered Mr. Bowen to 
reimburse one half of L.W.'s expenses paid by Ms. Wardle. 
Appellant correctly points out an improper citation to 11 USC §523(a)(15) in the 
court's Conclusions of Law. (R. 417-418). The court clearly decided this came under 11 
USC §523(a)(5) not 11 USC §523(a)(15). Interlineating the correct citation in the 
Conclusions of Law would make the document more accurate. However, the improper 
citation does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to make the determination it made 
Ms. Wardle should be awarded attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 
Section 30-3-3 as she was awarded fees by the trial court below. 
ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THIS CASE, 
Aa appealing party must show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is insufficient. Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv.Rep. 10 
(Utah 1999) see also Hansen v Stewart, 761 P.2d. 14 (Utah 1998). In this case, Appellant 
cannot show that the evidence of his income was insufficient to support a finding of 
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$60,000.00 for time that was "normally and consistently worked" at his full time job. 
U.C.A. Section 78-45-7.5(2). 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that Appellee's yearly 
income, based on historical earnings for previous years, not including 
overtime, was $60,000.00? 
Appellant seems to concede that there was a substantial change in circumstances 
due to the change in income for both parties. Therefore a modification of child support 
was appropriate. Appellant does not argue that the court misapplied the child support 
guidelines, assuming the court correctly determined the incomes of the parties. The 
argument of Appellant on the issue of child support is limited to his claim that the court 
picked the wrong number as Appellant's income. 
Even though Appellant was absent at trial, the court had considerable evidence of 
Appellant's income before it, including tax returns, pay stubs, Mr. Bowen's deposition 
and the prior orders and findings of the court. 
The only evidence that Appellant points to in support of his claim that the court 
abused its discretion was that to reach the number of $60,000.00, the court had to include 
some overtime pay. 
First Appellant argues that voluntary overtime pay should not be considered in a 
support award. In making this assertion, Appellant acknowledges that a court can include 
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overtime pay if it determines that the parent "normally and consistently" worked 
overtime. U.C.A. Section 78-45-7.5(2). 
On appeal, Appellant must "marshal! [sic] all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Whitear 
v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Appellant cannot show that 
the court abused its discretion in choosing the number of $60,000.00 as Appellant's 
income. However, the court considered all of the facts in determining the number of 
$60,000.00. This number was well supported by the average yearly income of Mr. 
Bowen over the four years prior to the trial. Based on the tax returns and pay stubs 
presented to the court, the court could have found that Mr. Bowen earned an average of 
$74,000.00 in 2002 and 2003 and based the award on that recent income history. (See 
Trial Exhibit M). The court exercised its discretion to Mr. Bowen's benefit based on the 
evidence presented at trial. 
Second, Appellant argues that the court must have included overtime by mistake 
because the court stated in its own findings that it would not consider voluntary overtime 
if it hasn't extended over a long period of time. See Appellant's Brief p. 9. If Appellant 
felt like the court did something that the court did not intend to do, Appellant should have 
filed a motion to amend findings pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure or a motion to amend the order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure within ten days of the court's signature on the Order Modifying the 
Divorce Decree. Failing to file the proper motion, Appellant cannot now argue that the 
court made an unintentional error. 
The two cases that Appellant cites for the proposition that child support should not 
be based on overtime pay are misconstrued. 
(a) In Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995), the court holds that "a 
full-time job can exceed forty hours per week if consistent with the obligee's prior 
practice." Id. n.3. 
The real question in the Bowcut case was whether it was proper for the trial court 
to consider what Bowcut claimed to be a "second source of income," and the court 
responded by holding that "both sources involved the performance of Bowcut's 
professional duties as a physician." Id. at 1057. The facts in the Bowcut case are not on 
point because Bowcut had two separate sources of income and Mr. Bowen only has one. 
However, the case reaffirms the discretion of the court in basing support on consistent 
overtime work. 
(b) In Hurt v. Hurt. 793 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that it would 
overturn a finding of fact (or the refusal to find a fact) based on a trial to the 
bench only if the appellant marshals all of the relevant evidence and shows 
the finding to be clearly erroneous. Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 
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760 (Utah 1990); Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). 
Francis has done neither in this case. 
IdLn.4. 
Mr. Bowen cannot show clear error on the part of the trial court. Although the 
trial court states that the voluntary nature of overtime had some effect on its exercise of 
discretion, Appellant has not cited the court to any precedent for the proposition that 
voluntary overtime cannot be considered by the court. Further, Appellant cannot marshal 
the evidence in favor of the findings and show by contrary evidence that the evidence in 
favor of fixing Mr. Bowen's income at $60,000.00 was insufficient. 
2. Did the court abuse its discretion by determining that the amount paid by Ms. 
Wardle for care of the child outside of regular school hours was reasonable in 
light on no contrary evidence? 
Appellant appears to argue that the court ordered him to pay preschool tuition not 
child care. However, the court makes no mention of the terms "preschool tuition". The 
court's Findings state that Ms. Wardle took L.W. to Challenger Day Care. (R. 409-410). 
An artful recharacterization of the court's findings is not an accepted method of 
contesting a matter on appeal. Rather, Appellant has the burden to "marshall [sic] all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence.M Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 
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There was no contrary evidence. The court in this case found that the day care 
expenses at Challenger day care were fair and reasonable, that Respondent presented no 
evidence that any fees incurred were unreasonable. There was no evidence that 
Respondent has requested reimbursement for any costs of private school tuition. 
Challenger was taking care of L.W. during the time that Ms.Wardle worked. Appellant 
introduced no evidence that the expenses were incurred during a time when Ms. Wardle 
was not working. Further, Mr. Bowen concedes at the top of page 3 of Appellant's Brief 
that the evidence before the court showed that a need for change of day care settings was 
necessary to "meet L.W.'s needs". 
Appellant's citation to precedent regarding contract law misconstrues the issue 
before the court. The obligation of each parent to pay one half of a child's day care is 
established by statute. The trial court has authority to interpret that statute within its 
discretion. In this case, the court interpreted the statute to mean that both parties would 
pay one half of the day care incurred at Challenger Day Care which is the same location 
that Mr. Bowen refers to as Challenger school or Challenger preschool. There is no 
evidence presented that would challenge the appropriateness of the court's exercise of 
discretion in determining that the costs charged by Challenger Day Care were reasonable 
and were divisible between the parents of L.W.. 
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3. Did the trial court act outside of its jurisdiction when it found that family 
support was undischargeable under Bankruptcy Code §523? 
Thae applicable Bankruptcy Code Sections state as follows: 
§523(a): "A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
(5) to a spouse . . . or child of the debtor, for 11 support of such spouse or 
child.. . . 
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor 
in the course of a divorce [or other such order]. . ." 
§523(c)(l) reads . . . "the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified 
in paragraph (2), (4), (6) or (15)of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the 
creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after ntoice and a heairng, the court determines 
such debt to be excepted from discharge." 
The findings of the trial court in this case were that "[b]oth the child care and 
medical expenses incurred by Petitioner in this case are in the nature of child support and 
were nondischargeable in bankruptcy." Although 4b of the Conclusions of Law 
mistakenly cites (a) (15), instead of (a)(5) of this section of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
language of the court's conclusions make it clear that the court intended the family 
support to be considered nondischargeable without a hearing. (R. 417). 
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Under section (a)(5), a creditor is not required to make a claim in a bankruptcy 
court when a court determines that the debt is in the nature of family support. All other 
judgments in a divorce setting come under 11USC §523(a)(15) such as division of assets, 
division of debts, and an award of attorneys' fees. These require a hearing to prevent 
discharge. 
The citation in the court's Conclusions of Law in incorrect. Ms. Wardle will 
stipulate that the reference at 4b of the Conclusions of Law to 11 USC §523(a)(15) should 
be amended in the Conclusions of Law to read 11 USC §523(a)(5). However, the 
conclusions of the court were proper under 11 USC §523(a)(5) and the state court did 
have jurisdiction to make that determination as to whether a domestic relations order was 
in the nature of family support. 
Regarding Bankruptcy Code 11 USC §523(a), Colliers states as follows, "for all 
the other exceptions [referring to sections (2) (4) (6) and (15), which are referenced above 
in 523(c)(1)] to discharge enumerated in §523(a), jurisdiction may be exercised by either 
the bankruptcy court or the state or other nonbankxuptcy court (citing In re Crawford, 103 
B.R.103, 33 C.B.C. 2d 1427 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1995))." 4 Collier on Bankruptcy §523.03. 
Section 523(a) is one of those enumerated sections which may be decided by a state court 
- it is the exception to discharge for obligations in the nature of family support. 
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Because the state court can determine dischargeability of a debt under §523(a)(5), 
the court should not overturn the determination by the trial court. Rather, if a change is 
needed to the Conclusions of Law, this court can simply order that the typographical error 
at paragraph 4b of the Conclusions of Law be corrected to refer to §523(a)(5). 
4. Did the trial court ere when it awarded Ms. Wardle attorneys5 fees? 
Attorneys' fee cites no law or facts that would support a claim that the court 
abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. 
B. Ms. WARDLE REQUESTS HER ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Wardle requests an award of attorneys' fees on appeal. In the case of Burt v. 
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1170) it states, "in Rasband [Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d, 1331 (Utah App. 1998)] we stated that a trial court has the power to make an award 
of attorneys' fees in divorce action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) . . . . 752 
P.2d at 1336. Ordinarily when fees in a divorce were awarded to the party who then 
prevailed on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal. Westin v. Westin, 
773 P.2d 408, 412. (Utah Court App. 1999); Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah Court App. 1989)." Id. Although the court in Burt did not award attorneys' fees on 
appeal, that decision was based on the grounds that the Defendant did not recover 
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attorneys' fees in the trial court below. However, in the present case, Ms. Wardle was 
awarded attorneys' fees which are disputed by Mr. Bowen on appeal. Based upon an 
award of attorneys' fees below and based upon Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989), Ms. 
Wardle requests this court to award attorneys' fees incurred by her on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there is no factual or legal basis to question the court's determination of 
Mr. Bowen's income, the court's division of daycare costs and medical expenses or the 
award of attorneys' fees, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
Further, Appellee requests the court to award attorneys' fees for having to respond 
to this appeal. 
DATED this )S day of September 2004. 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
M- /// -r,. 
Steve S. Christensen 
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner 
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